Shared Responsibility in the Sovereign Context
Sovereignty in the cloud is always a shared responsibility. The boundary is however different from classic security – sovereignty requires more active operator decisions, because provider defaults are often not sovereign.
What Providers Typically Control
| Area | Provider Responsibility |
|---|---|
Physical Security |
Data center, network backbone, hardware security. |
Base Compliance |
ISO 27001, SOC 2, BSI C5 attestations of the provider. Note: these attestations cover the provider, not the operator’s portion. |
Region Infrastructure |
Availability of regions, documentation on subprocessors, compliance certificates. |
Default Encryption |
Many services offer standard encryption with provider-managed keys. |
Audit Artefacts |
SOC 2 reports, ISO certificates, BSI C5 attestations as evidence for the provider’s portion. |
| Provider certificates (BSI C5, ISO 27001) cover the provider. They are not evidence of the operator’s sovereign compliance. Both sides must maintain their own evidence. |
What Operators Control (WAF++ Focus)
| Area | Operator Responsibility | WAF++ Control |
|---|---|---|
Data Classification |
Which data is classified how and what residency requirements apply. |
WAF-SOV-010 |
Region Pinning |
Technical enforcement of permitted regions via IaC and policy-as-code. |
WAF-SOV-020 |
Backup Configuration |
Where backups are stored, for how long, and whether restore tests are performed. |
WAF-SOV-030 |
Log Destinations |
Where logs, traces and metrics are exported. |
WAF-SOV-040 |
Key Management |
Whether CMK/BYOK/HYOK is used; rotation and deletion policies. |
WAF-SOV-050 |
IAM & Access |
Role model, privileged access, separation of duties, MFA enforcement. |
WAF-SOV-060 |
Break-Glass Process |
Who activates, what is logged, how it is reviewed afterwards. |
WAF-SOV-070 |
Subprocessors & Dependencies |
Inventory of all third-party providers and their jurisdiction, contractual basis. |
WAF-SOV-080 |
Egress Control |
Which outgoing connections are permitted and how exfiltration is detected. |
WAF-SOV-090 |
Exit Capability |
Documented, tested exit plan; data portability; IaC portability. |
WAF-SOV-100 |
The Sovereign Compliance Triangle
For complete sovereign compliance an organization needs three types of evidence:
┌─────────────────────────────┐
│ Provider Compliance Artefact│ ← BSI C5 attestation, ISO 27001 of the provider
└─────────────────────────────┘
+
┌─────────────────────────────┐
│ Operator Technical Evidence │ ← IaC configuration, audit logs, WAF-SOV checks
└─────────────────────────────┘
+
┌─────────────────────────────┐
│ Contractual/Process Evidence│ ← DPA, subprocessor lists, runbooks, reviews
└─────────────────────────────┘
If any one of the three layers is missing, the sovereign evidence is incomplete.
Contractual vs. Configurable Sovereignty
A common misconception: many providers offer "Sovereign Cloud" products. For WAF++ the following distinction applies:
| Aspect | Contractual | Configurable/Technical |
|---|---|---|
Jurisdiction |
Contract governs data location; often hard to enforce. |
Region pinning via IaC and policy – measurable and verifiable. |
Data access by provider |
Contractual clauses; Cloud Act risks cannot be eliminated by contract. |
HYOK technically eliminates the access possibility. |
Subprocessor changes |
Provider notifies; no technical control. |
Inventory + review process + contractual exit right. |
Data deletion at contract end |
Contractual clause; no technical proof. |
S3 Lifecycle, GDPR Art. 17 – technically implementable and verifiable. |
| For sovereignty-critical workloads the rule of thumb should apply: "If it is only governed contractually and not technically verifiable, it is not a sovereign control." |